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THE MORALITY OF
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Catholic thought in America has
almost always sought to preserve and perpetuate those elements
in the civil law which coincide with Catholic moral teaching. Catholics have, for example, resisted the liberalization of divorce laws,
have generally opposed any easing in legislation making contraceptives
more available and have spoken vigorously against any liberalization
in America's abortion laws. Catholics have acted with respect to
these legal-moral problems not by reason of a clearly articulated
jurisprudential position; they have acted more out of a rejection of
proposals for relaxed moral standards and a distrust for the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1833)
which has been so
influential in American thought with respect to the relationship of
morality and legality.
That utilitarianism was articulated by John Stuart Mill (18061873) who wrote as follows in his Essay on Liberty:
OR A VARIETY OF REASONS

That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the
liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will,
is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or
moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to
do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion
of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.

t This article was an address to the Twenty-Third Annual Convention, Catholic
Theological Society of America on June 19, 1968 at the Mayflower Hotel,
Washington, D.C.
* S.J., Dean, Boston College Law School.
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Although there appears to be nothing
binding on Catholics which would necessarily prevent a Catholic from endorsing
Mill's view of the civil law in a pluralistic
society, Catholic tradition and, possibly to
some extent, Catholic teaching have been
opposed to such a minimal role for the
state in the exercise of its role as the
preserver of morality. Catholics, it would
appear, would in general be more sympathetic to the approach to civil law
enunciated by Lord Devlin in his volume
"The Enforcement of Morals" (Oxford
Univ. Press, 1965) than to the opposing
viewpoint of Professor H. L. A. Hart
set forth in "Law, Liberty and Morality"
(Oxford Univ. Press, 1963) and "The
Morality of the Criminal Law" (Oxford Univ. Press, 1965).
It should be noted, however, that Catholics have not yet really explored the
impact of the "Declaration on Religious
Freedom" of Vatican I on what is
thought to be the traditional view of the
state's role in fostering public morality.
That Declaration stated that:
The usages of society are to be the
usages of freedom in their full range.
These require that the freedom of man
be respected as far as possible, and curtailed only when and in so far as
necessary. (Documents of Vatican II,
Abbott ed., p. 687).
As a perceptive footnote about this sentence explains, Vatican II here adds the
concept of freedom to the traditional
ideas of truth, justice and charity which
had hitherto dominated Catholic thinking
about the role of the state. The notion
that the freedom of men may be restricted only "when and in so far as necessary" revived an element in medieval
Catholic thought which can be said to be
the essential element of what today is

widely called the "free society." To
what extent this new exaltation of personal freedom may alter customary Catholic attitudes is not clear. But this new
accent on freedom surely contains a new
and profound principle which is capable
of bringing about the most profound shifts
in Catholic thinking about legal-moral
problems.
It seems clear that the relatively new
struggle about abortion and the law in
America is taking place in an era when
Catholics are seeking to incorporate the
new emphases and nuances of Vatican II
into their thinking while at the same time
trying to avoid the possibility of being
charged now or later with the sin of
silence.
Before any acceptable resolution of the abortion problem can be arrived at several crucial and complex questions must be posed and answered.
These questions can be conveniently
catalogued under three headings-(1)
Principles, (2) Pluralism and (3) Procedure.
The following discussion will
therefore center both on the nature of the
principles which Catholics should articulate about an appropriate law regulating
abortion in a religiously pluralistic society as well as the procedure or strategy
which Catholics should follow in this
area.
Principles
Although a Catholic is free to advocate
the theory of mediate animation (as Cardinal Mercier and others have done) the
overwhelmingly probable opinion in Catholic theology is that a human soul is infused at the moment of conception. Whatever theological latitude may be available
on this question is not, however, particularly relevant or helpful with respect
to the issue of abortion and the law. The
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moment of "ensoulment" is hardly pertinent when a woman, who is undeniably
pregnant, seeks an abortion. The fact
is that, whatever the conceptus at that
moment may be named, it is an entity
which possesses within it, as the geneticists
would put it, the blueprint and the machinery to produce a human being.
This is not, however, to minimize the
importance of the question as to when
"human" life begins but rather to suggest
that the metaphysical ambiguities which
exist within Catholic tradition about the
moment of the infusion of the soul do not
seem helpful with regard to the jurisprudence of legislation regulating abortion. In the ultimate analysis Catholics do
not differ from advocates of easy abortion
because Catholics hold that a human life
is present in the fetus from the earliest
moment of its existence. Catholics differ
with their opponents rather over the
nature and quality of the reasons which
can justify an abortion.
Utilizing the
traditional principles of moral theology
Catholic thought justifies at least the
termination of an ectopic pregnancy and
the unintended destruction of a fetus when
the removal of a uterus is medically required. Catholics therefore should move
away from any line of reasoning or species
of rhetoric which suggests that the proponents of abortion are advocating homicide. Catholics should delimit the question to the more precise issue involved,
namely, the nature of the reasons which
can furnish a moral justification for the
termination of the existence of the fetus.
The "principles" therefore which Catholics employ to argue against abortion do
not derive exclusively from Catholic tradition on the inviolability of the fetus but
draw also on Catholic thought regarding
the transcendence of any human or po-
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tentially human being over the health or
happiness of an older or more powerful
human being. The struggle over abortion
therefore is not a contest between those
persons or groups who see a fetus as a
human being and those who do not but
rather between conflicting views as to the
relative importance of mere existence vis
d vis a high quality or excellence of existence. Catholics, to put it another way,
tend to feel, in the words of Aquinas,
that it is better to be than not to be,
while some non-Catholics prefer to stress
the quality of any existing being rather
than the mere existence of such a being.
It seems fair to say that the real issues
in the complex legal-moral abortion struggle have not yet really been clarified or
enunciated. No Catholic group in America has to date advocated "liberalization"
of the civil law regulating abortion nor
has any group even expressed the opinion
that Catholics are free to select their own
views on this matter. Many factors may
help to explain this phenomenon but the
persistent inability or unwillingness of
Catholics in America to separate morality
from legality is surely one of the principal
reasons.
It may be that no significant development can be expected in the refinement or
the application of those moral principles
by which Catholic thought condemns abortions in all but the two cases noted above.
But can or should Catholics be so entirely certain of their own moral position
in this regard that they should insist that
their own hierarchy of values with regard
to fetal life must be incorporated into
the civil law?
Abortion, to be sure, is arguably
patently immoral than divorce or
control. But does this fact justify
olics taking the same negative and
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olithic positions on abortion which they
have almost always assumed with respect
to laws regulating divorce and birth control?
It is submitted that Catholics, while
they continue to clarify and enunciate
what they feel to be the profound moral
implications of abortion, should simultaneously indicate their complete willingness
to discuss abortion openly and completely
and, if their judgment becomes so inclined, to accept and indeed advocate a
legal regulation of abortion different from
the present legal arrangement in America. Until this is done the pro-abortion
forces will continue to think that Catholics are really not in favor of sincere
dialogue on this issue and that Catholic
power will remain totally and irreversibly
behind the legal status quo.
It might eventuate, to be sure, that
Catholics, after a thorough dialogue on all
aspects of the question of abortion and
the law, might come to the conclusion
that existing bans on abortion represent
the best and fairest method of regulating
an almost intractable area of human existence. But Catholics would then have
some factual and pragmatic arguments
against changes in the abortion laws rather
than the present Catholic position which
simply asserts as self-evident the immorality (and therefore somehow the criminality) of extinguishing the life of a nonviable fetus regardless of the strength of
the reasons asserted to justify such a
course of action.
The indispensibility of true dialogue by
Catholics on this question leads to the
second division of this paper, the identification of ethical norms for a morally
pluralistic society.

Catholics, Morality and Pluralism
The statement on religious freedom
of Vatican II gives some support to the
contention that Catholics should not seek
to impose their own moral principles on
those who do not subscribe to them.
At the same time the document speaks
of the necessity of government action
which "is to be controlled by juridical
norms which are in conformity with the
objective moral order." (Abbott, p. 686).
If one assumes that a fetus is a person
deserving of the protection of the government one could argue that the Declaration on Religious Freedom is unequivocal
since it states that the "protection and
promotion of the inviolable rights of man
ranks among the essential duties of government." (Id. at 684).
One could
similarly argue that the Declaration's assertion of "the need (by government) for
a proper guardianship of public morality"
(Id. at 687), gives support to the case
for laws against abortion.
On the other hand, if one begins with
the assumption that a significant minority or even a majority of persons in
America think that women should have
a legal right to dispose of an unwanted
pregnancy one must look for guidance in
other assertions in the Declaration. If
one can conclude that those who favor
legalized abortion are rejecting a doctrine
which in the final analysis is a Christian
or sectarian teaching then the firm repudiation of all forms of coercion contained
in the Declaration on Religious Freedom
become relevant. The Declaration urges
that "in spreading religious faith and in
introducing religious practices, everyone
ought at all times to refrain from any
manner of action which might seem to
carry a hint of coercion or of a kind of
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persuasion that would be dishonorable or
unworthy. . . ." (Id. at 682) (emphasis
supplied).
If criminal sanctions against
abortion were enacted a century ago into
Anglo-American law because of Christian
convictions is it arguable that today Christians who seek to perpetuate these laws
as binding on non-believers are engaging
in a "manner of action which might seem
to carry a hint of coercion?" Neither the
question nor its answer is particularly
clear at this point in the discussion about
abortion. But surely the question with
all its ramifications needs to be raised and
answered as candidly and courageously as
possible.
The full thrust of the case for abortion
on request must be explored by Catholics.
In all candor it has not yet been taken
very seriously by Catholics; its advocates
have been impugned and sometimes treated
almost as if they were public enemies.
The case for making abortion available
on request is based on the following contentions:
1. The civil law of a religiously pluralistic and morally diverse nation such as
America should not perpetuate a law
based on moral concepts with which a
significant number of persons disagree
when the repeal of that law will not bring
grave injury to third parties.
2. This principle is particularly applicable in the field of conduct involving
sex and marriage since in this area the
civil law is at best a feeble instrument
to enforce public policy. The new notions of privacy and intimacy made applicable to marriage by the United States
Supreme Court in the Connecticut birth
control decision highlight the importance
of allowing married couples the most complete freedom in planning their lives and
their families.
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3. A law forbidding abortion penalizes
a part of the community while it reenforces the morality of another group
within the community. An absence of
a law on abortion would not penalize one
group nor would it harm those who are
against abortion since it would merely
withdraw the criminal sanctions which
now are attached to their particular view
of human existence-sanctions which
those who are against abortion presumably do not need.
4. Criminal law cannot effectively operate in the area of abortion since all
activity of this nature is clandestine and
surreptitious. Abortion, like adultery and
fornication, is not an appropriate subject
for the criminal law.
Catholics and others may be in fundamental disagreement with some or all
of these principles by which the advocates
of abortion on request build their case.
But a responsive answer cannot be forthcoming unless Catholics, having engaged
in a meaningful dialogue, concede, reject
or qualify the contentions of those who
desire that abortion be removed from the
criminal law, and become a matter of
private concern.
Catholic attitudes on abortion legislation can become operative in a number
of ways. No one disputes the right and
duty of Catholic people and leaders to
proclaim their viewpoints on the immorality of abortion. Indeed, one could say
that such proclamation is really the only
way to make this view prevail since laws
forbidding abortion cannot be effective
unless they are supported by a substantial
segment of public opinion.
Catholic attitudes on abortion legislation can also be enunciated by individual
bishops or by episcopal statements. These
pronouncements, although directed to the
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moral issue, can also be interventions in
the political order in that they teach,
directly or indirectly, that legislators
should retain existing laws prohibiting
abortion. It is submitted that episcopal
statements going beyond the morality of
abortion and entering into the question of
jurisprudence or the best legal arrangement are inappropriate intrusions in a
pluralistic society by an ecclesiastical official who wrongly assumes that he can
pronounce on a legal-political question
a moral and uniform position of his
Church.
Sometimes Catholic bishops have made
pronouncements on abortion and the law
as a result of a statement made by some
state-wide Protestant Council of Churches
endorsing a version of the Model Penal
Code. Protestants who desire no legalization of abortion or Protestants who feel
that the law should allow abortion on
request can make their convictions known.
But Catholic clerics or laymen have not
spoken out against the decrees of bishops
condemning any change in the abortion
laws. This may be due to the timidity,
the ignorance, the loyalty or the subservience of Catholic clerics and laymen,
but the impression that non-Catholics receive is that when a bishop or a group
of bishops make a pronouncement on a
complex legal-moral-political matter Catholics must accept it as binding on their
minds and on their votes. Surely the
image of freedom within the Church is
not conveyed by such episcopal presumptions and such unquestioning docility on
the part of the clerics and lay people.
The pluralism of moralities which exists in America does not make the Catholic Church's role as a guardian of moral
values an easy one. But that role cannot effectively be exercised if Church

leaders continue to allow an unresolved
legal-moral problem to grow to the point
where the Church is on the defensive,
has lost the initiative and ends up
fighting a rear-guard action to preserve
the status quo.
There is no doubt whatever that countless individuals and several opinion-molding groups in America are convinced
that the Catholic Church is using its
persuasion, its prestige and its political
power to fight any change in the abortion laws. These individuals and associations are sometimes afraid to speak
openly about the role of the Church lest
they deepen the Church's antagonism to
the causes they espouse. But the damage which is done to those who see the
Church as a monolithic, unbending and
powerful organization totally unresponsive
to the requests of persons with a different view of morality is incalculable.
The Church, to be sure, is destined, like
its Founder, to be a "sign of contradiction." But, nonetheless, communication
and conciliation must be engaged in responsively and endlessly.
It may be that some Catholics will
conclude that their conscience forbids
them to make any concessions on the
abortion issue in the civil law. For these
persons the issue is not negotiable. A
reasoned position coming to this conclusion is not necessarily contrary to the
recognition of plural moralities to which
Catholics are bound by reason of the
Declaration of Religious Freedom of
Vatican II. But if one comes to such
a judgment he must then resolve the
question of the measures which he may
utilize to implement his view in the context of a democratic, free and pluralistic
society. That subject, though crucially
important for Catholics, is complex and
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not specifically relevant to the questions
discussed here.
Having outlined the principles and the
problem of pluralism which make the
abortion problem a very troublesome one
for Catholics let us proceed to the procedures or strategies which Catholics should
follow in this area.
Procedures and Strategies for
Catholics
If Catholics are to be meaningfully involved in the formulation of a new policy
with regard to abortion they must not
remain on the sidelines but must recognize the serious social problem which
arises from the fact that between 200,000
and 1,200,000 illegal abortions occur
each year. From what is known of the
problem-and the ignorance about it is
monumental-some 80% of the persons
receiving illegal abortions are married
and from the middle class. Their problem is not medical; they simply want to
dispose of an unwanted and unplanned
pregnancy.
Catholics and everyone else should
recognize that the Model Penal Code
offers no solution to this social problem.
Its provisions allowing abortion in cases
of rape, incest or the predictably defective child would affect an infinitesimally
small number of cases. The allowance
by the Model Penal Code of abortion to
prevent grave injury to the physical or
mental health of the mother would similarly result in few abortions-unless the
"mental health" provision is gravely
abused and exploited.
The enactment of the Model Penal
Code in 1967 in California, Colorado,
North Carolina and Georgia has not, from
any statistics available in June 1968,
sharply escalated the number of abor-
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tions in these states. Nor has the enactment of the Code in those states brought
under medical supervision the vast number of illegal abortions in those regions;
indeed, the passage of the Model Penal
Code may have increased the number
of illegal abortions-as its acceptance in
Scandanavia did.
It should be clear therefore that a
defeat of the Model Penal Code at the
hands of Catholics does not "solve" the
problem of abortion. Catholics cannot
responsibly work each year to defeat any
change in the abortion laws and think
that they have thereby "solved" the
problem. To cite one instance: Catholics cannot oppose legalized abortion for
a predictably defective fetus while they
fail to raise a hand to improve the almost
primitive conditions found almost universally in those state institutions to
which the retarded and deformed are sent.
More importantly, Catholics must admit
the fact that abortion on demand is
being urged by sincere and conscientious
people who in their more candid moments
concede that they desire easy abortion
for situations where contraception has
failed.
In reacting to the mounting momentum
behind the request for easily available
abortions, Catholics should seek to obtain
a legal regulation of abortion which would
attempt to achieve at least the following
objectives:
1.

Minimize
deaths;

2.

Avoid the imposition of sectarian
beliefs on those who do not accept them;

3.

Secure an arrangement by which
women seeking an abortion will
be treated humanely; and

the

number

of

fetal
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4.

Provide all possible safeguards to
prevent any erosion of public
respect for the sanctity of life.

It is, of course, possible that no law
could be drafted which would achieve
This possibility,
these four objectives.
however, does not alter the fact that neither a total ban on abortions nor the
concessions made in the Model Penal
Code achieve the four objectives stated
above.
In view of the fact that abortion on
request will continue to be sought, and
in view also of the fact that the enactment of the Model Penal Code may tend
to bring about a de facto system of abortion on demand, Catholics should look
to those protections and safeguards which
could be written into a law regulating
abortion not with criminal sanctions but
by legal provisions designed to attain the
four objectives indicated above.
The opportunities and advantages of
the withdrawal of criminal prohibitory
sanctions and the imposition of a civil
law regulating the granting of an abortion include the following:
1. The repeal of criminal laws forbidding all forms of non-therapeutic abortions would allow the government for the
first time to prosecute vigorously all nonphysicians who perform abortions. If a
legal abortion were available through
doctors and hospitals, those persons engaged in the unauthorized practice of
abortions could be jailed as society would
jail non-physicians attempting brain or
even cosmetic surgery.
2. A mandatory waiting period with
competent counselling for the woman
seeking an abortion could also be required if criminality did not automatically
attach to any activity preparatory to a

non-therapeutic abortion. Counselling with
the mother and her husband (or the
father of the child) might well convert an
unwanted pregnancy into a wanted one;
at least such counselling might assist a
woman who proceeds to an abortion to
profit by her experience and not become
a repeater-a not unusual phenomenon.
3. Allowing the practice of abortion
to come out of the "under-ground" would
make possible for the first time a survey
of the scope of the problem and would
thus facilitate intelligent attempts at resolving it.
4. The repeal of unenforced and
largely unenforceable laws against abortion would decrease the disregard and
contempt for law which the widespread
defiance of any law always breeds. The
repeal of abortion laws, furthermore, may
be inevitable because chemistry and
pharmocology might well replace surgery
as the ordinary abortifacient agent; the
"morning-after" pill is a dramatic example.
Catholic acquiescense, therefore, in a
legal arrangement which substitutes civil
regulation of abortion for criminal sanctions against virtually all abortions should
not be looked upon as a "surrender" or
"abdication" of a system which worked
or which "solved" the problem of abortion. There are many opportunities and
advantages in a system which does not
stigmatize a woman seeking an abortion
as a criminal.
No one, of course, denies that there
may well be a loss of opportunities and
serious disadvantages in a legal system
which allows a woman to have an abortion for reasons which seem sufficient to
herself. Such an arrangement to be sure
keeps the state out of the business of
decreeing what type of pre-natal beings
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may be eliminated but it also withholds
the state's firmest protections-its criminal sanctions-from human beings during the first twenty weeks of their fetal
life.
The central and crucial issue is whether
the withdrawal of criminal sanctions (not
of all of the protections of the law) from
this very tiny area of human life will,
may or could result in a diminution of
that respect for human life which is the
cardinal principle and indeed the centerpiece of all Anglo-American law. An
answer to that imponderable question is
difficult to document either way. If one
begins with the reasonable assumption
that at least the same number of illegal
abortions will continue to occur each
year in America regardless of the law's
attitude on abortion, one could hope that
insistence upon carefully supervised medical, hospital and counselling services for
all women seeking an abortion would at
least mitigate the harm to the mothers
who would in any event secure an abortion regardless of the law. On the other
hand, there is no blinking at the fact that
for many persons neutrality towards
abortion on the part of the civil law
would be construed as society's acceptance of this practice as moral.
Conclusions
If there is one thing which should be
clear from the foregoing and from the
state of the question regarding abortion
and the law in America it is that there
is no such thing as a "Catholic position"
on the jurisprudence of abortion laws.
Catholics are free to advocate any one of
the three options available-strict legal
prohibition of abortion, the Model Penal
Code, or abortion on request.
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Statements by bishops on abortion and
the law have tended to give the impression of an episcopal preemption on
the subject of what is best for the secular
law to do about abortion. In the past
episcopal "official" statements on legalmoral matters have inhibited initiative
among Catholics, stifled freedom of
thought and confused morality and legality. A striking example is the denunciation of the McCollum decision in the
November 1948 annual message of the
American hierarchy. That statement repudiated the 8 to I ruling of the U.S.
Supreme Court (which banned released
time programs from public school premises) as wrong in "law, logic and history"
and called upon all Catholics to work
"patiently and perseveringly" for the reversal of the McCollum decision. The
bishops may have been right or wrong on
a matter of constitutional law but one
could raise a serious question whether
the categorical denunciation on the part
of the hierarchy inhibited Catholic jurists
and scholars from creative thinking with
respect to the place and role of religion
in the public school.
It is painfully clear that Catholics confront in the abortion issue an agonizing
question of public policy which could
divide Catholics, weaken ecumenical relations and place Catholics and the Church
in the years and decades ahead either in
the position of having sinned by the use
of its prestige and power against the
sincerely held convictions of non-Catholics
and non-believers or as a group which
failed by silence to speak up when misguided men and women changed the law
(Continued on Page 264)
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of excessive damages. These problems
seem easily surmountable by requiring a
joinder of the wife's cause of action with
that of her husband, by extending the
use of insurance, and through careful jury
instructions.
In short, no legitimate reason can be
given to withstand the weight of the
inescapable conclusion that the wife's right
is a tort separate and apart from that of
her husband against which needless bars
have been erected to deny her recovery.
Fortunately, some courts have recognized

this and have begun to update their protection of consortium in keeping with its
modem definition. Those courts which
have not recognized the modern concept
of a co-equal interest in the marital relationship and have discriminatorily protected interests therein, will be forced to
grant the wife a cause of action for loss
of consortium upon negligent injury to
her husband. Antiquated tort notions
can prove no bar to modem constitutional
mandates.
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ence, that it is awesome and that it is
inescapable. Hopefully, it is a challenge
which, unlike any previous challenge, will
arouse the minds and consciences of
American Catholics to original, creative
thought on a legal-moral problem of incalculable significance.

(Continued)
to permit the extermination of undesirable
and unwanted human beings.
It seems self-evident that this challenge
is unique in American Catholic experi-

